Certainty about the Absence of Positive Future Events as a Unique Predictor of Suicidal Ideation over an 18-Month Period by Rombola, Christina A
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
School of Arts & Sciences Theses Hunter College 
Summer 8-6-2018 
Certainty about the Absence of Positive Future Events as a Unique 
Predictor of Suicidal Ideation over an 18-Month Period 
Christina A. Rombola 
CUNY Hunter College 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/hc_sas_etds/362 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 









Certainty about the Absence of Positive Future Events as a Unique Predictor                                     
of Suicidal Ideation over an 18-Month Period 
by 
Christina Rombola 
Submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts General Psychology, Hunter College 




    Thesis Sponsor: Dr. Regina Miranda, Ph.D. 
       August 6, 2018                                     Dr. Regina Miranda, Ph.D. 
       Date                 Signature 
       August 6, 2018                 Dr. Evelyn Behar, Ph.D. 











 I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my mentors, Dr. Regina Miranda and Dr. 
Evelyn Behar, for their wonderful support and guidance through the completion of this project. 
Many thanks to all members of the Miranda Lab, past and present, for all of their 
encouragement, accolades, and assistance, and who are inspiring to me in their own right. I 
would also like to thank Ms. Karolina Czech, Dr. Sandeep Prasada, and Dr. Martin Chodorow 
for their assistance throughout my course in the MA program and for always fielding my many 
questions! My heartfelt thanks as well to all of my family, friends, coworkers, former teachers, 
and fellow students whom I have had the sincere privilege of knowing and whose kindness and 





























 Few studies have examined the precise cognitive mechanisms that may predict suicidal 
ideation (SI). Depressive predictive certainty is a dichotomous construct used to conceptualize 
how hopelessness can lead to SI and is comprised of certainty about the absence of positive 
future events (Certainty-AP) and certainty about the occurrence of negative future events 
(Certainty-N). In the present study, data from a nonclinical sample of 354 young adults in the 
New York City metropolitan area followed over an 18-month period were analyzed to assess the 
predictive utility of these constructs. We hypothesized that Certainty-AP would more strongly 
predict higher SI at 18 months from baseline than Certainty-N, beyond the effects of depressive 
symptoms, and that hopelessness would partially mediate this relationship. Further, we 
hypothesized that low positive future-event fluency (PFEF) would moderate the relationship 
between Certainty-AP and higher levels of SI at 18 months. Results indicated that T1 Certainty-
AP significantly predicted 18-month SI while Certainty-N did not, but not independently of 
generalized hopelessness or depressive symptoms. Further, depressive symptoms, and not 
hopelessness, fully mediated this relationship. Low PFEF did not moderate the effects of 
baseline Certainty-AP or Certainty-N on 18-month SI, but Certainty-AP and Certainty-N 
significantly moderated the effects of low baseline PFEF on 18-month SI. These findings suggest 
that Certainty-AP may lead to future SI via depressive symptoms, and that future SI may 
increase as a function of high depressive predictive certainty and low PFEF. An integration of 
these cognitive models of suicidal ideation and potential clinical implications are discussed. 
Keywords: depressive predictive certainty, depression, hopelessness, future-event cognitions, 
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Certainty about the Absence of Positive Future Events as a Unique Predictor  
of Suicidal Ideation over an 18-Month Period 
Suicide is a widespread and pervasive phenomenon of serious concern for families and 
clinicians. Of particular interest is suicide among young adults, who are at elevated risk for 
suicidal ideation and attempts (Mortier et al., 2017; Piscopo, Lipari, Cooney, & Glasheen, 2016). 
Suicide is the second leading cause of death among individuals aged 10-34 years in the United 
States (CDC, 2016). Recent findings have also indicated that 4% of individuals aged 18 or older 
in the United States reported suicidal thoughts in 2015, and that serious suicidal ideation was 
most prevalent among young adults aged 18-25 years (Piscopo et al., 2016). As per a recent 
meta-analysis by Mortier et al. (2017), approximately 1 in 4 college students report having 
experienced thoughts of suicide. Adolescents hospitalized for a suicide attempt have been found 
to be at elevated risk for repeat attempts within 6-12 months (Goldston et al., 1999) and within 1-
2 years (Goldston et al., 1999; Prinstein et al., 2008) following the index attempt. Notably, other 
meta-analyses have suggested that over 80% of adolescents hospitalized for suicidal ideation or 
attempts have received some form of mental health treatment (Nock et al., 2013). These trends 
prompt concern regarding the long-term efficacy of treatments targeted to adolescents and young 
adults who may be susceptible to suicidal thoughts or behaviors and underscore the need for 
interventions that home in on relevant risk factors for suicide.  
With regard to terminology, suicide has been defined as “the act of intentionally ending 
one’s own life”; suicidal ideation as “thoughts of engaging in behavior intended to end one’s 
life”; and suicide attempt as “engagement in potentially self-injurious behavior in which there is 
at least some intent to die” (Nock et al., 2008, p. 134).  Efforts to identify clinical predictors of 
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anxiety disorders (e.g. Beautrais, 2000; Nock et al., 2010; MacLeod, Pankhania, Lee, & Mitchell, 
1997), namely major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder (Gilmour, 2016), and 
substance dependence disorder, as well as previous suicide attempts (Lewinsohn, Rohde, & 
Seeley, 1994), and a history of non-suicidal self-injury (Gutierrez, Osman, Barrios, & Kopper, 
2001; Pérez Rodriguez, Marco Salvador, & García-Alandete, 2017). In addition, cognitive 
behaviors such as rumination, defined as “repeated thoughts about the causes, meaning, and 
consequences of one’s negative mood” (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008), have 
been linked to suicidal ideation, as well as cognitive risk factors including negative attributional 
style (Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989), and hopelessness (e.g. Beck, Steer, Kovacs, & 
Garrison, 1985; Beck, Steer, Beck, & Newman, 1993). Hopelessness has been identified as a key 
mediator in the relationship between rumination and depression (Andersen, 1990) as well as 
suicide (Smith, Alloy, & Abramson, 2006) and has been defined by early conceptualizations as 
“a system of cognitive schemas whose common denomination is negative expectations about the 
future” (Beck Weissman, Lester, & Trexler, 1974, p. 864).  
Conceptually, hopelessness has been distinguished from pessimism in that it refers to 
one’s existing negative views of the future, whereas pessimism has been considered an enduring 
personality trait (O’Connor & Conway, 2007). Andersen (1990) identified hopelessness as a 
“proximal cognitive predictor” of depression, and further defined the construct in terms of 
depressive predictive certainty, the belief that positive future outcomes will not occur whereas 
negative future outcomes will occur. This is distinguished from pessimism, which Andersen 
defines as an individual’s likelihood estimations of positive and negative events, specifically that 
positive events are unlikely and negative events are likely to occur. According to Andersen, 
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positive future outcomes and the presence of negative future outcomes, and upon feeling 
powerless to alter such events (Andersen & Lyon, 1987). This formulation is derived from the 
hopelessness theory of depression, coined by Abramson et al. (1989), which posits that 
hopelessness is a “proximal sufficient cause,” that is, an etiological factor that increases the 
likelihood of depressive symptoms, rather than a symptom of depression. According to this 
theory, an individual possessing a depressive attributional style is thought to become depressed 
by way of his or her negative appraisals of past events, which confer hopeless expectations about 
the future.  Lack or absence of positive future expectations has also been conceptualized in the 
cry of pain model of suicidality (Williams, 2001) as a diminished “rescue factor”, that is, a 
feature thought to protect against suicidal behavior. This model proposes that stress confers risk 
for suicidal thinking or behavior by way of three mechanisms: perceived defeat, feelings of 
entrapment, and low anticipation of rescue. In effect, the individual feels powerless to alter 
undesired occurrences that he or she believes to be inevitable.  In a test of this model, Rasmussen 
et al. (2010) found that low levels of positive future thinking compounded the effects of 
entrapment in predicting suicidal ideation. In considering these theories alongside Beck’s 
cognitive triad, which proposes that depression develops from negative views of the self, the 
world, and the future (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979), an individual’s appraisal of undesired 
future events and the certainty that they will occur would appear to carry strong implications for 
suicide risk.  
Depressive predictive certainty has been significantly associated with increased 
depressive symptoms (Andersen, 1990). In Andersen’s (1990) study, which utilized a nonclinical 
sample of young adults, individuals scoring high on a measure of depressive symptoms were 
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counterparts, anticipating negative events as more likely and positive events as less likely with 
greater degrees of certainty. Extant research on the potential link between depressive predictive 
certainty and suicidal ideation as well as depression remains limited, and particularly work that 
aims to examine the differential impact of certainty about the absence of positive future events 
versus certainty about the occurrence of negative future events. However, high levels of certainty 
when anticipating the absence of positive future outcomes has been more strongly associated 
with suicidal ideation than negative outcome certainty, even independently of depression 
(Sargalska, Miranda, & Marroquin, 2011).  By contrast, a study of a nonclinical sample of young 
adults found that certainty about negative future outcomes, but not certainty about the absence of 
positive future outcomes, mediated the relationship between suicide attempt history and future 
suicidal ideation even after adjusting for generalized hopelessness and depressive symptoms, but 
with little variation in scores on the two predictive certainty domains (Krajniak, Miranda, & 
Wheeler, 2013). 
 Research on the relationship between hopelessness and depression bears further 
mentioning, and particularly on how these constructs may interact to predict suicidal thoughts 
and behaviors. Generalized hopelessness, as contrasted with depressive predictive certainty, 
refers to hopelessness as measured by the Beck Hopelessness Scale (Beck & Steer, 1988) and 
does not incorporate the “certainty” construct. Horwitz et al. (2017) examined participant scores 
on the positive and negative expectation subscales of the BHS separately as potential predictors 
of suicidal ideation and attempts, and found evidence to suggest that low positive future 
expectancies more strongly predicted SI and SA. Miranda, Fontes, and Marroquin (2008) found 
support for the mediational role of hopelessness on depressive predictive certainty in predicting 
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the absence of positive future events and depressive symptoms, while partially mediating the 
relationship between certainty about the occurrence of negative future events and depressive 
symptoms. Further, the authors found that anticipating an absence of positive future outcomes 
was significantly associated with an increase in depressive symptoms, but not symptoms of 
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). By contrast, increased anticipation of negative future 
outcomes was more strongly associated with combined depression and GAD, a finding that 
supported previous work by Miranda and Mennin (2007). Similar findings by MacLeod and 
Byrne (1996) showed that fewer positive future expectancies were generated by individuals with 
anxiety and depression, but not anxiety only, and that levels of hopelessness were more elevated 
among the former group. MacLeod and Salaminiou (2001) also found evidence of reduced 
positive future expectations relative to controls, which was correlated with higher levels of 
depression, but not anxiety. This clinical distinction between anxiety and depression appears to 
comport with Clark and Watson’s (1991) tripartite model, which suggests that these disorders 
share a “general distress factor” (p. 316) that may be characterized by a broad range of aversive 
states, e.g. upset, anger, fear, or sadness, also termed “negative affectivity” (p. 320). In addition, 
the model suggests that depression may be distinguished from anxiety in that it is specifically 
characterized by low or absent positive affectivity, which refers to feelings of energy and 
positive engagement and can lead to feelings of fatigue and anhedonia when not present 
(Watson, Clark, & Carey, 1988). Neuroticism, a facet of personality as defined in the Five-Factor 
Model (McCrae & Costa, 1991), also encompasses broad aversive features such as anxiety, 
hostility, impulsivity, and depression, and has been associated with increased risk for the 
development of depressive symptoms and suicidal ideation (Rappaport, Flint, & Kendler, 2010). 
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have demonstrated lower levels of positive future thinking than nondepressed controls, but no 
significant differences from controls on negative future thinking (Bjärehed, Sarkohi, & 
Andersson, 2010). These effects have also been displayed among individuals who have engaged 
in nonfatal suicidal behavior (Hunter & O’Connor, 2003).  
In addition to the certainty component of positive and negative future thinking, the 
amount of cognitive fluency with which an individual generates positive and negative event 
predictions has been associated with suicidal ideation and attempts (e.g. MacLeod, Rose, & 
Williams, 1993). In developing the Future Thinking Task (FTT), a measure used to assess future-
event cognitive fluency, MacLeod et al. (1993) determined that anticipating the absence of 
positive future outcomes is functionally distinct from anticipating the presence of negative future 
outcomes, and that reduced ability to generate positive future event predictions is more strongly 
related to depression than increased ability to generate negative predictions, particularly with 
regard to specific self-oriented future predictions. Reduced ability to generate positive future 
thoughts for oneself but not for others has also been found among self-injuring adults and has 
been attributed to an impaired ability to appraise favorable personally-relevant goals as attainable 
(MacLeod & Conway, 2007). In a modification of the FTT that required participants to yield 
likelihood estimates of positive and negative future events, as well as ratings of how happy or 
unhappy they would feel if each outcome was to occur, MacLeod et al. (1998) found that patients 
who engaged in self-injury with suicidal intent unknown generated significantly fewer positive 
future expectations, but not more negative future expectations, than controls.  
Some work suggests that depressed individuals generate greater amounts of negative 
future expectations and lesser amounts of positive future expectations with greater automaticity 
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& Limpert, 2001; Andersen, Spielman, & Bargh, 1992). A study employing a measure of 
implicit future thinking in depression found that subclinically depressed individuals generated 
fewer positive future expectations than controls but did not significantly differ from controls in 
their likelihood estimates of future events (Kosnes et al., 2013). A study of hospitalized patients 
compared the power of low positive future expectancies with generalized, self-reported 
hopelessness to determine the better predictor of suicidal ideation, and found that the former 
more strongly predicted ideation after approximately 2.5 months from hospital discharge, while 
negative future expectancies did not independently predict ideation (O’Connor, Fraser, Whyte, 
MacHale, & Masterson, 2008). Furthermore, hopelessness has been linked to latency in 
generating both specific positive and negative future event predictions when adjusting for 
depression (MacLeod & Cropley, 1995), and negative attributional style (O’Connor, Connery, & 
Cheyne., 2000).  
In consideration of the above extant findings, the aims of the present study were twofold: 
(1a) to examine the differential impact of Certainty-AP versus Certainty-N on severity of future 
SI over an 18-month period, as well as (1b) the mediating roles of generalized hopelessness and 
depressive symptoms in the relationship between Certainty-AP versus Certainty-N and SI at 18-
month follow up; and (2) to determine the extent to which positive future-event fluency 
moderates the relationship between Certainty-AP and future SI at 18-month follow up. Based on 
the findings of the cross-sectional study by Sargalska et al. (2011), we hypothesized that: (1a) 
Certainty-AP would more strongly predict high levels of SI at 18-month follow-up than 
Certainty-N, with (1b) hopelessness partially mediating this relationship more strongly for 
Certainty-AP than Certainty-N. Further, we hypothesized that low but not high levels of positive 
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higher levels of SI. While no previous studies to our knowledge have examined the interaction 
between positive future-event fluency (PFEF) and Certainty-AP versus Certainty-N on later SI, 
some work has found evidence for the moderating role of PFEF in the relationship between 
stress and hopelessness (O’Connor, O’Connor, O’Connor, Smallwood, & Miles, 2004). Factors 
adjusted in our analyses included demographic variables, baseline depressive symptoms, and 
generalized hopelessness. 
Method 
 The present study employed a longitudinal design to build upon preliminary work by 
Sargalska et al. (2011), which utilized a cross-sectional design to examine the differential impact 
of Certainty-AP and Certainty-N on suicidal ideation, with hopelessness partially mediating both 
relationships. Measures were administered at the initial screening phase, baseline assessment (1 
month from initial screening), and at follow-up periods at 3 months, 12 months, and 18 months 
from the baseline assessment.  
Participants 
Our data were collected in the years between 2010 and 2015 from a non-clinical sample 
of individuals aged 18-34 years (M = 19.08, SD = 2.22), recruited from a large public college in 
the New York City Metropolitan area and enrolled in an introductory psychology course, or from 
the general community local to this area via newspaper or web-based advertisements. At initial 
screening, 2,540 individuals were recruited and administered measures assessing suicidal 
ideation in the previous 6 months or lifetime suicide attempt history, as described below. A 
subsample of 354 participants completed the baseline, first session, and between 0-3 of the 
follow-up assessments, 278 of whom completed all sessions and measures. The final sample was 
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Hispanic, 11% Black, and 8% mixed/other ethnicity. Additionally, 84% identified as 
heterosexual. Overall, 40% of the final sample reported some history of suicidal ideation or 
attempt, while the remaining 60% reported no history of suicidal ideation or attempt. Twenty 
percent met criteria for a mood disorder (45% for any psychiatric diagnosis) within the previous 
year, and the retention rate from baseline to the final phase of the study was 83%. Of the 354 
participants, 23% endorsed suicide ideation within the 6-months prior to baseline, 24% endorsed 
at least one lifetime suicide attempt (2% in the previous year), and 47% reported no history of 
suicidal ideation or attempt. By 18 months from baseline, 3% of participants reported having 
suicide attempts over the course of this study, and 10% endorsed suicidal ideation within the 
previous 6 months. Eleven percent of our sample reported having participated in mental health 
treatment due to previous suicide attempts, and only 9% reported receiving current treatment at 
baseline and at 18-month follow-up. 
Measures 
Demographic Information Questionnaire. A battery of questions was developed 
specifically for this study and administered to all participants at initial screening, which was 
comprised of items assessing age, gender, race/ethnicity, nation of origin (of participants and 
their parents), number of years as a United States resident, current year in school, and sexual 
orientation. 
Suicidal Behavior Screening (SBS). The SBS is a measure developed specifically for 
this study, consisting of 6 items derived from the Diagnostic Interview Schedule for Children 
(DISC; Shaffer et al., 2000), and was administered to detect the presence of suicidal ideation 
and/or attempts within the previous year, previous 6 months, and any history of lifetime ideation 
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included, which ask if treatment was received following suicide attempts (if applicable), the type 
of treatment at that time (e.g., psychotherapy, pharmacological, etc.), if mental health treatment 
was currently received, and the type of present treatment, if yes. 
Beck Depression Inventory, Second Edition (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). 
The BDI-II is a 21-item self-report measure assessing clinical features of depression over the last 
two weeks. Each item consists of a statement to which participants indicate agreement using 
responses coded on a Likert scale from 0 (e.g. “I do not feel sad”) to 3 (e.g. “I am so sad and 
unhappy that I can’t stand it”), with some items reverse-scored. A total scaled score is calculated 
from responses to all questions and can range from 0 to 63. Scores between 21-30 are considered 
indicative of moderate, 31-40 of severe, and 41 or higher of extreme clinical depression. The 
BDI has demonstrated high internal consistency and convergent validity in a large body of work 
utilizing clinical and nonclinical samples (Beck et al., 1996; Whisman et al., 2000; Storch, 
Roberti, & Roth, 2004). The scale demonstrated high internal consistency in the present study (α 
= .92), with and without the inclusion of item 9, which assesses suicidal ideation. In the present 
study, baseline scores ranged from 0-56 for depressive symptoms (M = 16.33, SD = 10.99).  
Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck & Steer, 1988). The BHS is a 20-item self-report 
measure administered to assess level of overall hopelessness about the future. Each item consists 
of a statement addressing hopeless expectations about the future, to which participants indicate 
their agreement with a response of “true” or “false”. The scale includes 11 negatively-phrased 
(e.g. “My future seems dark to me”) and 9 positively-phrased (e.g. “I look forward to the future 
with hope and enthusiasm”) items, with some items reverse-scored. Each response of “true” to a 
negative and “false” to a positive item is counted towards a total score ranging from 0-20. The 
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severe (Cochrane-Brink, Lofchy, & Sakinofsky, 2000). High internal consistency as well as 
convergent and discriminant validity have been reported for the BHS (Steed, 2001), and this 
scale demonstrated high internal consistency in the present study (α = .97). Baseline scores on 
hopelessness ranged from 0-19 (M = 5.40, SD = 4.60). 
Beck Scale for Suicidal Ideation (BSS; Beck & Steer, 1991). The BSS is a 21-item self-
report measure used to assess active and passive suicidal thoughts experienced within the past 
week, including the present day. Each item requires participants to select from a set of 3 
statements that best describes how they have been feeling, and responses are coded on a 0-2 
scale (i.e., 0 = “I have a moderate to strong wish to live.”; 1 = “I have a weak wish to live.”; 2 = 
“I have no wish to live.”). Items 20 and 21 address the occurrence of one or more past suicide 
attempts and the severity of one’s wish to during the last attempt but are not included in the total 
score. The total score is calculated from responses to questions 1-19 and can range from 0 to 38. 
A score of 3 is considered indicative of higher suicide risk (Beck & Steer, 1991). The BSS has 
demonstrated good internal consistency as well as construct and concurrent validity among 
adolescent populations (Holi et al., 2005). High internal consistency was found for the BSS in 
our study (α = .87). SI scores at T1 ranged from 0-29 (M = 2.67, SD = 5.17) and from 0-15 at T4 
(M = 0.78, SD = 2.51).  
Future Events Questionnaire (FEQ; Miranda & Mennin, 2007; see also Andersen, 
1990). The FEQ is a 34-item measure used to assess depressive predictive certainty. It is 
comprised of 17 positive and 17 negative future events arranged in random order, for which 
participants are asked to indicate “yes” or “no” as to whether each event is likely to happen to 
them, and to rate their degree of certainty about these predictions on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 
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of “no” responses to positive future events with certainty ratings of “5” (Certainty-AP), and the 
number of “yes” responses to negative future events with certainty ratings of “5” (Certainty-N). 
This scale demonstrated high internal consistency in our study, both for the Certainty-AP (α = 
.87) and Certainty-N subscales(α = .91), consistent with prior work (Miranda & Mennin, 2007). 
Baseline Certainty-AP scores ranged from 0-7 (M = 0.35, SD = 0.98), while baseline Certainty-N 
scores ranged from 0-12 (M = 1.51, SD = 2.23).  
Computerized Diagnostic Interview Schedule for Children - Young Adult Version 
(C-DISC; Shaffer et al., 2000). The C-DISC is a structured clinical interview designed to 
measure symptoms of various mental disorders according to criteria outlined in the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th Edition (DSM-IV). It is designed to be 
administered by lay interviewers, clinicians, or for participant self-administration. The 
computerized assessment presents a series of questions to be read by the interviewer, to which 
the participant provides yes/no responses. Diagnoses are established by means of a computer 
algorithm. In this study, the C-DISC was used to assess for clinical disorders present within the 
past month and past year of baseline assessment. While the original instrument was intended for 
use with children and adolescents, the young adult version is tailored to individuals older than 17 
years (Shaffer et al., 1998). Additionally, it is considered particularly advantageous in that it 
adheres closely to precise diagnostic criteria as stated in the DSM-IV and ICD-10 manuals 
(Shaffer et al., 2000). 
Future Thinking Task (FTT; MacLeod, Rose, & Williams, 1993). The FTT is a 
measure employed to assess positive and negative future-event fluency. Participants were asked 
to generate as many positive (or negative, in a separate task) events they expect to experience 
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with one minute allowed for each condition. The order in which conditions were presented was 
counterbalanced, and participants were verbally prompted by an experimenter, to whom they 
verbally delivered all responses aloud. The experimenter recorded and coded all responses by 
hand. Two total scores were calculated as follows: positive future-event fluency and negative 
future-event fluency (i.e. the total number of positive/negative future events generated across all 
conditions). In the present study, aggregate totals of the number of future events generated were 
collapsed across all three conditions (next week, next year, next 5-10 years) and computed 
separately for positive and negative future events. This practice is in keeping with prior studies, 
as no effects have been found for time period (MacLeod et al., 2005). The number of positive 
future events generated ranged from 0-35 (M = 15.79, SD = 5.26), while the number of negative 
future events generated ranged from 0-28 (M = 13.21, SD = 4.91). 
Procedure 
 Participants were initially screened in groups of 4-8 individuals in a private classroom 
space at a large public college in the New York City Metropolitan area, from which much of the 
sample was recruited. At the screening phase, participants were administered the SBS, BHS, 
BDI-II, BSS, and FEQ. The baseline phase of this study (T1) was conducted approximately one 
month after initial screening, using a subsample of 354 participants stratified by suicidal ideation 
and attempt history. Participants returned individually and completed the C-DISC and FTT. At 
each follow-up phase (3 months, 12 months, and 18 months from baseline; T2, T3, and T4, 
respectively), participants completed the FTT, SBS, BHS, BDI-II, BSS, FEQ, and items 
indicating the presence and type of any current treatment received. At each phase of the study, 









Group Differences and Correlations among Study Measures 
 All analyses were run using IBM SPSS Statistics Version 24.0. A series of one-way 
ANOVA tests were conducted to examine potential differences in our study variables by 
demographic category, and revealed that there was no significant omnibus difference in T4 SI for 
race/ethnicity, F(4, 293) = 1.75, n.s., as was the case for sexual orientation, F(5, 293) = 0.76, 
n.s., and gender, F(1, 293) = 0.66, n.s.  There was a significant gender difference on T1 
Certainty-AP, t(333) = 2.27, p < .05, with females reporting higher Certainty-AP (M = 0.40, SD 
= 1.10) than males (M = 0.21, SD = 0.48), but no other significant gender differences were found 
for other study variables. 
A series of correlations were examined between T4 SI and scores on several clinical 
predictors at T1, T2, and T3. There was a significant positive correlation between T1 Certainty-
AP and T1 SI, r(353) = .34, p < .01, as well as T4 SI, r(293) = .12, p < .05. T1 Certainty-AP was 
also significantly correlated with T1 and T4 depressive symptoms, r(353) = .44, p < .01; r(293) = 
.24, p < .01, respectively, and with T1 and T4 hopelessness, r(351) = .40, p < .01; r(293) = .24,  
p < .01, respectively. Certainty-AP and Certainty-N at T1 were strongly correlated, r(353) .54,   
p < .01. However, there was no significant correlation between T1 Certainty-N and T4 SI, r(293) 
= .10, n.s.. A significant relationship was found between T1 Certainty-AP and PFEF-T1, r(353) 
= -.20, p < .01, but not NFEF-T1, r(353) = .00, n.s. For all correlations, see Table 1.  
Certainty-AP as a Unique Predictor of Suicidal Ideation  
A series of hierarchical multiple regression analyses were conducted to examine the 
ability of T1 Certainty-AP to predict T4 SI when adjusting for several important covariates. Prior 
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Certainty-AP in predicting T4 SI, b = 0.31, SE = 0.15, p < .05; F(1, 291) = 4.50, p < .05; R2 = 
.015. By contrast, T1 Certainty-N did not yield a significant total effect on T4 SI, b = 0.11, SE = 
0.07, n.s.; F(1, 291) = 3.05, n.s.; R2 = .010. In our first hierarchical regression, we examined the 
effect of T1 Certainty-AP when adjusting for T1 depressive symptoms. T1 depressive symptoms 
was entered into Block 1, and T1 Certainty-AP into Block 2. In this model, Certainty-AP no 
longer significantly predicted T4 SI, b = -0.10, SE = 0.16, n.s., although the overall model was 
significant, F(2, 290) = 18.97, p < .01, with an R2 = .116 and adjusted R2 = .110, indicating that 
these predictors accounted for about 11% of the variance in T4 SI. For full results of this 
regression, see Table 2. 
Our second analysis examined the effect of T1 Certainty-AP (entered in Block 2) when 
controlling for T1 hopelessness (Block 1). As with T1 depressive symptoms, T1 Certainty-AP no 
longer significantly predicted T4 SI when controlling for T1 hopelessness, b = 0.01, SE = 0.15, 
n.s. Our model was significant, F(2, 288) = 14.12, p < .01, with an R2 = .089 and adjusted R2 = 
.083, indicating that these predictors accounted for about 8.3% of the variance in T4 SI. For full 
results of this regression, see Table 3. 
The Mediational Effects of Hopelessness and Depressive Symptoms on the Relationship 
between Certainty-AP and Suicidal Ideation versus Certainty-N and Suicidal Ideation 
Given the strong relationships between T1 Certainty-AP, hopelessness, depressive 
symptoms, and T4 SI, a series of serial mediation analyses were conducted using both 
hopelessness and depressive symptoms at T3. These analyses were performed using the 
PROCESS Macro for SPSS and SAS version 3.0 (Hayes, 2018). In our first analysis, our 
variables were entered as follows: T1 Certainty-AP (X), T3 hopelessness (M1), T3 depressive 
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14.47, p < .01, and that T3 depressive symptoms, but not T3 hopelessness, significantly mediated 
the effect of T1 Certainty-AP on T4 SI, b = 0.21, SE = 0.08, 95% CI: 0.07, 0.40. T1 Certainty-
AP no longer significantly predicted T4 SI once controlling for T3 depressive symptoms, b =      
-0.02, SE = 0.16, n.s., consistent with full mediation. Approximately 13.5% of the variance in SI 
was accounted for in this model, R2 = .135, and indirect effects were tested using a bootstrap 
estimation approach with 5,000 resamples. For the full results of this analysis, see Figure 1. 
Our second serial mediation analysis was conducted to examine the potential mediational 
impact of T3 depressive symptoms and T3 hopelessness on the relationship between T1 
Certainty-N and T4 SI. Our variables were entered as follows: T1 Certainty-N (X), T3 
hopelessness (M1), T3 depressive symptoms (M2), and T4 SI (Y). Results indicated that T3 
depressive symptoms, and not T3 hopelessness, significantly mediated the T1 Certainty-N and 
T4 SI relationship, b = 0.08, SE = 0.03, 95% CI: 0.03, 0.16, as with the T1 Certainty-AP and T4 
SI relationship. The overall model fit was significant, F(3, 279) = 14.57, p < .01. Approximately 
13.5% of the variance in T4 SI was accounted for by these predictors, R2 = .135, and indirect 
effects were tested using a bootstrap estimation approach with 5,000 resamples. For the full 
results of this analysis, see Figure 2. 
Future-Event Fluency as a Moderator of the Certainty-AP and Suicidal Ideation 
Relationship 
 To address our second aim, a series of moderation analyses were also conducted using 
PROCESS to test whether T4 SI increased as a function of high T1 Certainty-AP and low 
positive future-event fluency. In our first analysis, we examined T1 Certainty-AP as our 
predictor and PFEF-T1 as our moderator. Our second hypothesis was not supported, as no 
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and the overall regression model was not significant, F(3, 289) = 2.00, n.s. We further examined 
these potential interaction effects using PFEF at T2, b = -9.06, SE = 0.04, n.s.; F(3, 281) = 2.44, 
n.s., T3, b = -0.04, SE = 0.03, n.s.; F(3, 279) = 2.16, n.s., and T4, b = 0.06, SE = 0.03, n.s.; F(3, 
289) = 2.93, p < .05, none of which were significant, although the latter relationship was a non-
significant trend (p = .058). 
 An alternate configuration of these variables was also considered to explore the PFEF 
and Certainty-AP relationship with T4 SI, using PFEF-T1 as our predictor variable and T1 
Certainty-AP as our moderator. While T1 Certainty-AP did not significantly moderate the 
relationship between PFEF-T1 and T4 SI, significant interaction effects were found for 
Certainty-AP at T2, b = -0.12, SE = 0.03, p < .01; F(3, 283) = 9.16; p < .01, T3, b = -0.11, SE = 
0.03, p < .01; F(3, 280) = 10.59; p < .01, and T4, b = -0.12, SE = .04, p < .01; F(3, 288) = 8.89; p 
< .01, on the PFEF-T1 and T4 SI relationship. The Johnson-Neyman technique showed that these 
relationships were significant when Certainty-AP was higher than 0.26 at T2, b = -.06, SE = .03, 
p = .05, 0.38 at T3, b = -.06, SE = .03, p = .05, and 0.31 at T4, b = -.06, SE = .03, p = .05. 
 In light of these findings, we were interested in examining the potential interaction effects 
of PFEF on Certainty-N and T4 SI, as well as Certainty-N on PFEF and T4 SI. As with 
Certainty-AP, no significant interaction effects were found for PFEF at T1, T2, T3, or T4 on the 
T1 Certainty-N and T4 SI relationship. However, when PFEF-T1 was entered as predictor and 
Certainty-N as moderator, a significant effect was found for Certainty-N at T4, b = -0.04, SE = 
0.01, p < .01; F(3, 288) = 11.12; p < .01. The Johnson-Neyman technique showed that this 
relationship was significant when Certainty-N was higher than 0.47, b = -.05, SE = .03, p = .05. 
Certainty-N at T1, T2, or T3 were also examined separately as moderators of the PFEF-T1 and 








In accordance with our first hypothesis, T1 Certainty-AP significantly predicted suicidal 
ideation at T4 prior to adjusting for other covariates, while T1 Certainty-N displayed no such 
significant relationship. As suggested in previous literature (Miranda et al., 2008), an explanation 
for this finding may be that a high degree of Certainty-AP confers greater risk for the 
development of depression than would Certainty-N, and perhaps in severe cases, thoughts about 
suicide. While high Certainty-N may likewise be indicative of hopelessness and depressive 
symptoms, the ability to acknowledge the potential for positive future events to occur, even when 
highly certain about negative outcomes, may be protective against the long-term effects of 
negative future expectancies. This would support Andersen’s (1990) theory that an individual 
becomes hopeless upon reaching 100% certainty about the inevitability of both the occurrence of 
negative future events and nonoccurrence of positive future events. Even while experiencing 
thoughts of undesired potential outcomes in one’s future, one does not truly reach the threshold 
of hopelessness if one retains some sense of hope, however seemingly vague, that personally-
relevant desired events can transpire. It is the point at which an individual perceives negative 
events and an absence of positive events to be truly inevitable that he/she puts forth much 
reduced efforts to alter those likelihoods in a favorable direction (Andersen, 1990; Andersen & 
Limpert, 2001; Andersen et al., 1992). However, it is important to note that once adjusting for 
generalized hopelessness and depressive symptoms, Certainty-AP no longer significantly 
predicted SI at 18-month follow-up. This contrasts with the findings of Sargalska et al. (2011) 
and may suggest that while Certainty-AP more strongly predicts future suicidal ideation than 
Certainty-N, it does not operate independently of generalized hopelessness or depressive 
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concert with each other, with Certainty-AP and Certainty-N homing in on the more specific 
cognitive processes nested within the greater clinical picture of hopelessness and depression. The 
shared variance among these clinical variables in predicting later suicidal ideation may serve as 
evidence for the general distress factor described by Clark and Watson (1991) in their tripartite 
model of anxiety and depression. One’s certainty that positive future outcomes will not occur 
may be one component leading to the development of depressive symptoms and potentially 
suicidal ideation, but may be subsumed under the umbrella of low or absent positive affectivity 
in fulfilling that function. 
Our serial mediation analysis using hopelessness and depressive symptoms at T3 in our 
study demonstrated that the direct effect of T1 Certainty-AP on T4 SI lost significance once each 
mediator was entered, and that the depressive symptoms, but not hopelessness, significantly 
accounted for this relationship. The same held true for the baseline Certainty-N and 18-month SI 
relationship, though less strongly than with Certainty-AP. This suggests that depressive 
predictive certainty can lead to suicidal ideation via depressive symptoms, with more general 
feelings of hopelessness leading to the development of those symptoms. These findings lend 
support for Abramson et al.’s (1989) model by demonstrating that Certainty-AP may operate via 
hopelessness in predicting depressive symptoms and, at high levels of severity, future suicidal 
ideation. In work utilizing an older adult sample, Conaghan and Davidson (2002) found that 
depression emerged as a stronger mediator than hopelessness in the relationship between reduced 
positive future thinking and suicidal behavior. 
To address our second aim, we sought to explore the potential moderating influence of 
low positive-future event fluency at baseline (PFEF-T1) on the relationship between baseline 
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interaction between future-event fluency and depressive predictive certainty, as these constructs 
have previously been examined separately.  Thus, we sought to address this gap in the literature 
and integrate these cognitive predictors of suicide. An unexpected finding was that our second 
hypothesis, that low fluency in generating positive future events would moderate the effect of 
high baseline Certainty-AP on high 18-month SI, was not supported. However, we found 
significant effects when inserting Certainty-AP at 6 months, 12 months, and 18 months as a 
moderator of the baseline PFEF and 18-month SI relationship.  
By contrast, no significant interaction effects were found using PFEF at any of the four 
time points as a moderator of the baseline Certainty-N and 18-month SI relationship, and only 
Certainty-N at 18 months significantly moderated the effects of baseline PFEF on 18-month SI. 
A possible explanation for this finding could be that depressive predictive certainty does not 
precede, but emerges in response to, one’s decreased ability to generate thoughts about positive 
future events. In other words, one becomes certain about the low likelihood (or absence) of 
desired future outcomes upon realizing that he/she is unable to think of any specific such 
occurrences, and not vice versa. This would comport with Andersen and colleagues’ “certainty-
as-efficiency hypothesis,” which posits that when pessimistic future expectancies come to mind 
effortlessly, one comes to view those outcomes as unavoidable (Andersen et al., 1992). Further, 
our finding that Certainty-AP significantly moderated the effect of baseline PFEF on 18-month 
SI at three time points (6 months, 12 months, and 18 months), as opposed to one (18 months) for 
Certainty-N, appears to align with our first hypothesis that Certainty-AP is more strongly 
predictive of future SI than Certainty-N, and provides support for previous theories that 
underscore the functional distinction between these two constructs.  The stronger association 
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PFEF and Certainty-N. It may be plausible that one can feel highly certain about the occurrence 
of negative future events without necessarily failing to generate thoughts of positive future 
events as much as would be the case when highly certain about no positive future events. In 
addition, PFEF and Certainty-AP at T2, T3, and T4 and PFEF and Certainty-N at T4 may have 
significantly predicted T4 SI due to closer temporal proximity to the 18-month time follow-up 
period.  
Strengths 
A potential strength of this study was the racial and ethnic diversity of our sample, which 
was utilized to overcome the limitations of homogeneity, given that predominantly White 
samples have frequently been employed in similar research (Cha et al., 2017). Our sample was 
also thought to be fairly representative of the broader New York City Metropolitan population. 
In addition, the use of nonclinical participants was useful in illuminating potential risk factors 
that may predict future suicidal thoughts or behaviors irrespective of clinical diagnosis or history 
of suicidal ideation or attempt.  
The utility of the assessments we used to measure our variables of interest also warrants 
some attention. The FTT has been cited as advantageous in examining future-event fluency due 
to its open-ended format, wherein individuals are asked to generate a list of expected personally-
relevant future events (MacLeod et al., 1993). This may yield a more meaningful measurement 
of the underlying cognitive processes that may be impaired in depressed individuals than might 
be captured by traditional self-report measures. The FEQ, by contrast, presents a list of 
preformulated future events, but which are thought to be generalizable to most populations, 
though particularly young adults given the inclusion of items that may apply more to this age 
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2007). The measure is thought to extend beyond other measures of pessimism in that individuals 
are asked to rate their certainty that each event will occur, in addition to its likelihood.  
Limitations 
 Our use of a nonclinical sample to measure suicidal ideation may have also presented this 
study with several important limitations. First, the low scores of this sample on Certainty-AP, 
Certainty-N, and SI at baseline and 18-month follow up are expected to be significantly lower 
than scores found among clinical samples, and thus may be of limited generalizability to such 
populations, and interpreted with caution. Further, an important conceptual issue with regard to 
our predictors must be addressed: Certainty-AP, by definition, requires that an individual be 
convinced about an absolute absence of desirable future outcomes in his/her life, which would 
presumably necessitate an inability to generate thoughts of any positive future events 
whatsoever, and not merely low frequencies of such thoughts. It is worth noting that only four 
participants (three at baseline, one at 12-month follow up) yielded PFEF scores of “0”, indicating 
that no positive future thoughts were generated for either the next week, next year, or next 5-year 
conditions. While it may be the case that a more clinically depressed and suicidal sample would 
generate higher Certainty-AP and lower PFEF scores, it seems logical to suggest that even 
relatively high and low scores on these domains, respectively, can serve as meaningful indicators 
of potential suicidal ideation risk. It is expected that complete certainty about the absence of 
positive future events and inability to generate thoughts of likely such events may not frequently 
be found, especially among nonclinical samples and as captured in self-report measures as part 
of voluntary psychological research participation. 
As an additional note, our results may be largely relevant to females given the high 
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also bear mentioning; for example, some often-cited criticisms of such measures include the 
problem of demand characteristics, especially if a measure is readministered in the same study 
(Gemar, Segal, Sagrati, & Kennedy, 2001), as was the case in ours, and the lack of suitability for 
measuring underlying cognitive schemata that may operate outside of one’s awareness (Gotlib & 
Krasnoperova, 1998). It is possible that positive and negative future expectancies as captured by 
our measures may have been influenced by transient mood states present during each assessment 
rather than enduring future-event schemata. The longitudinal design of this study was expected 
to account for such a phenomenon, but it is plausible that the depressive predictive certainty and 
cognitive fluency scores yielded at each time point could be attributed to circumstantial events. 
Further, our findings may be circumscribed to young adults given the age range of our sample, 
and additional research examining how these constructs operate in other populations will be 
instructive.  
Conclusion 
A negative view of one’s future has been cited as the most important component of 
Beck’s cognitive triad in predicting the development of depression (Roepke & Seligman, 2016), 
which appears to underscore the potential impact of depressive predictive certainty on suicidal 
thoughts and behaviors. However, not everyone who is depressed has thoughts about suicide; so 
it is important to carefully examine the precise mechanisms that may be at work in the 
progression from depressed to suicidal thoughts. Further research on depressive predictive 
certainty employing similar longitudinal designs and clinical samples may be warranted to 
examine the utility of Certainty-AP in predicting future suicidal ideation more broadly. We 
propose that depressive predictive certainty, namely Certainty-AP, and its relationship with 
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by the BHS. More frequent use of the measures of future-event fluency and depressive predictive 
certainty in future studies may provide fine-grained insights into the kinds of hopelessness-
related cognitions experienced by at-risk young adults that may be crucial to better streamlining 
prevention and treatment interventions targeted to this age group, and to broadening awareness 
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Table 1. Correlation Matrix for Clinical Predictors of T4 SI 
 





            
2. BHS1 .30** ---            
3. BHS3 .27** .61** ---           
4. BDI1 .34** .69** .49** ---          
5. BDI3 .36** .51** .72** .63** ---         
6. CtAP1 .12* .40** .33** .44** .34** ---        
7. CtAP2 .21** .26** .35** .28** .36** .40** ---       


































   
11. CtN3 .09 .27** .39** .31** .44** .24** .26** .41** .56** .59** ---   
12 PFEF1 -.07 -.21** -.20** -.16** -.14* -.20** -.12* -.19** .03 -.04 .01 ---  
13. PFEF2  .01 -.16** -.12* -.07 -.03 -.12* -.03 -.08 .01 -.03 -.03 .56** --- 
14. PFEF3 -.06 -.23** -.22** -.14* -.08 -.18** -.15** -.17** -.01 -.10 -.10 .48** .67** 
 
Notes: BSS = Beck Scale for Suicide Ideation; BHS = Beck Hopelessness Scale; BDI = Beck Depression 
Inventory; CtAP - Certainty about the Absence of Positive Future Events; CtN = Certainty about the 













Hierarchical Regression Analysis of T1 Depressive Symptoms and T1 Certainty-AP 







Hierarchical Regression Analysis of T1 Hopelessness and T1 Certainty-AP  
on T4 Suicidal Ideation 
 
  Step 1   Step 2  
T1 Predictor b SE p b SE p 
Hopelessness .16 .03 .00 .16 .03 .00 






  Step 1   Step 2  
T1 Predictor b SE p b SE p 
Depressive Sxs .08 .01 .00 .08 .01 .00 








Serial Mediation Model with T1 Certainty-AP as a Predictor of T4 SI 
 
Total Effect: T1 Certainty-AP → T4 SI (at 18-month follow-up) 





























Serial Mediation Model with T1 Certainty-N as a Predictor of T4 SI 
 
Total Effect: T1 Certainty-N → T4 SI (at 18-month follow-up) 




Indirect Effect: X → M1 → M2 → Y = 0.08* 
 
 
 
